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Abstract: We attribute consciousness to other humans because their anatomy and behavior 
resembles our own and their verbal descriptions of subjective experiences correspond to ours. 
Nonhuman mammals have somewhat humanlike behavior and anatomy, but without the verbal 
descriptions. Their sentience is therefore open to Cartesian doubt. Robot "minds" lack humanlike 
behavior and anatomy, and so their sentience is generally discounted no matter what sentences 
they generate. Invertebrates lack both neurological similarity and language. Although it may be 
safest in making moral judgments to assume that some invertebrates are sentient, cogent 
reasons for thinking so must await an objective causal explanation for subjective experience. 
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I agree with Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) that "Phenomenal consciousness is... a precondition 
for moral standing" in the fullest sense of that term, and that "some form of mental life is a 
precondition for morally protectable interests." It is therefore morally important to know 
whether cats, fish, or beetles are sentient. How can we tell? 
I know that I am conscious most of the time. I believe that other people are also 
conscious most of the time, because they are very like me in: 
 (A) their anatomy and physiology,  
 (B) their general behavior (e.g., their responses to stimuli), and 
 (C) their verbal testimony about their subjective experiences   
These three kinds of evidence justify that intuitive belief in the consciousness of other people. 
They also warrant the belief that, like me, other people experience periods of unconsciousness, 
mainly during sleep. Waking and sleeping are distinguished by different patterns of neural 
activity in the brain, suggesting that consciousness is the product of particular patterns of brain 
activity, rather than brain anatomy per se. 
Some sleepers open their eyes, walk around, and perform various waking-type activities 
while manifesting slow brain waves and other correlates of sleeping unconsciousness. On being 
aroused from this "sleepwalking" state, they often display surprise and disorientation. They may 
report having no recollection of their sleepwalking activities. Though the behavior of 
sleepwalkers is usually somewhat abnormal or defective (especially in linguistic performance), 
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they may do some distinctively human things, including driving cars and playing musical 
instruments (Zadra & Pilon 2012, Perreault 2014). These facts indicate that even fully human 
brain anatomy and distinctively human behavior do not guarantee phenomenal consciousness.  
How do we know that other animals are sentient? Are they sleepwalking even when they 
appear to be awake? Here we are on uncertain ground. Many nonhuman animals alternate 
between discrete states of wakefulness and sleep, and it is natural to think that this disjunction 
corresponds to a subjective difference between consciousness and unconsciousness, as it does 
in humans. But the analogy is imperfect with respect to traits (A) and (B) above, and wholly 
deficient with regard to (C). The brains and behavior of (say) dogs are somewhat like ours in 
many ways, but hardly identical. Most important, dogs cannot give us any verbal reports on their 
experiences. In principle, some degree of Cartesian skepticism about their sentience is therefore 
warranted. In practice, we nevertheless all assume that dogs feel pain when we tread on them 
and they yelp. This seems like the safest assumption from a moral standpoint.  
In the case of machines, we encounter deficiencies in both traits (A) and (B). Properly 
programmed, computers can generate appropriate-sounding written sentences laying claim to 
all sorts of subjective experiences, although their verbal behavior (like that of sleepwalkers) 
usually falls short of being convincingly human. The causal underpinnings of that verbiage (trait 
A), however, and the behavioral context in which it emerges (trait B), are so utterly unlike those 
of humans that few attribute sentience to such machines or regard them as deserving moral 
consideration. 
Invertebrates also have two kinds of deficiencies: their "brains" and other organs are not 
homologous with those of humans (trait A), and they cannot generate verbal reports on their 
internal states (trait C). The case for their sentience can rest only on analogies between their 
alien neurology and aspects of human neurology known to be correlated with states of 
conscious awareness (trait A), or between their behavior and analogous human behaviors 
known to be reliable signals of mental states (trait B). 
M&P draw analogies of both sorts. In seeking neurological analogies, they point to 
"structural characteristics that could support sophisticated forms of cognition" in arthropods 
and molluscs, including "central processing regions... that continuously receive, integrate, and 
exchange information with peripheral systems... permitting centralized coordination of multi-
modal sensory information and executive (top-down) control."  But the computer metaphors 
implicit in this analogy betray its fatal flaw: any structural arrangement claimed to cause and 
demonstrate phenomenal consciousness can be modeled in machine systems that are (almost) 
surely not sentient (Van Hateren 2016). The unfortunate fact is that we have no theory of the 
causes of consciousness that can justify inferring sentience from some neurological 
arrangement. 
M&P point to neurochemical and behavioral changes in insects and cephalopods 
following various sorts of stimuli as evidence for emotionally glossed conscious experience:  
distress in injured shrimps, aspirational intentionality in hermit crabs, pessimism in shaken 
bumblebees, and so on. But trying to infer emotional mental glosses from animal behavior runs 
into what I once called the Darwinist's Dilemma: 
We can reliably infer subjective pain from the yelp of a kicked dog only if the 
yelp serves no objective purpose. If it can be seen as adaptively useful—say, 
by serving to alert nearby kin to danger—then we can argue with 
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Malebranche that God or natural selection has simply endowed dogs with a 
mechanical squeaker to enhance their reproductive fitness, and that ‘‘if they 
act in what seems to be an intelligent and purposive manner, it is only 
because God has made them fit to survive.’’ (Cartmill 2000, p. 840). 
Likewise, a bumblebee may be more averse to risk after a vigorous shaking, not because the 
shaking has filled it with pessimistic feelings, but because increased caution is on the whole an 
adaptive response to a more dangerous environment, and will be programmed by natural 
selection into the mechanical responses of a well-adapted bumblebee. 
M&P make two important points that should inform future debate on this issue. First, it 
is imperative that we stop equating phylogenetic proximity to Homo sapiens with the vertical 
dimension on the scala naturae, after the fashion of Morgan's Canon. The scala naturae is a 
myth. Second, we have no reason to assume that a very small lump of neurons cannot produce 
phenomenal consciousness, because we have no idea how or why objective, observable 
phenomena can produce sentience. It may not take anything like a human brain to do it. But 
until we know how to do it and why it happens, conjectures about sentience in invertebrates, 
and decisions about their moral status, will depend on our individual intuitions as to what 
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